Choice experiments designed to extend beyond the classic application of choice among perfect substitutes have become popular in marketing research. In these experiments, often referred to as menu based choice, respondents face choice sets that may comprise substitutes, complements, and offers that provide utility independently, or any mixture of these three types. The inferential challenge posed by data from such experiments is in the calibration of utility functions that accommodate a mix of substitutes, complements, and "independent" offers. Moreover, while a prior understanding of the product categories under study may, for example, suggest that two offers in a set are essentially perfect substitutes, this may not be true for all respondents. To address these challenges, we combine Besag's (1972 Besag's ( , 1974 autologistic choice model with a flexible hierarchical prior structure. We explain from first principles how the autologistic choice model improves on the multivariate probit model, and on models that include cross-price effects in the utility function. We develop Bayesian inference for the autologistic choice model, including its intractable normalizing constant. Finally, we find empirical support for our model in a menu based conjoint experiment investigating demand for game consoles and accessories and we illustrate implications for optimal pricing.
Introduction
Menu based choice experiments (MBCEs) that extend beyond the case of choice among perfect substitutes as in choice based conjoint (CBC) have become popular recently (Liechty et al., 2001; Orme, 2010) . In analogy to the choice of a starter, a main course and a desert from a restaurant menu, MBCEs accommodate any combination of substitutes, complements and independent offers in the choice sets, i.e., the menus presented to respondents. As a consequence, the utility maximizing choice from such a choice set may be a combination of the individual offers available in the choice set. The prototypical MBCE (Orme, 2010) presents each respondent with multiple menus to choose from, varying the prices or the availability of individual offers in the menus. The resulting data is used to calibrate choice models designed to rationalize the choice of the various combinations of individual offers from the menus. In turn, menu optimization then proceeds based on the calibrated choice model. Typical optimization problems involve determining profit maximizing prices of individual offers in a menu and more generally which offers to include. A critical input to these optimization problems are the relationships between offers in a menu, i.e., the degree to which two offers constitute substitutes, complements, or are viewed as independent from each other.
Current modeling approaches model relationships between individual offers through correlated errors (Liechty et al., 2001) or by including selected cross-price effects (Orme, 2010) . A different approach that has not seen an application to MBCEs is the autologistic choice model (ALCM) developed by Besag (1972; 1974) and introduced into marketing by Russell and Petersen (2000) . In the ALCM, particular combinations of offers are of higher (lower) utility because of complementary (substitutive) relationships.
We show that the ALCM is preferable to the existing approaches as a basic model for choices from menus on theoretical considerations. Specifically, we show that correlated errors only provide for a limited representation of complementarity and substitution relationships. We also show that the inclusion of cross-price effects in individual level choice models has counterintuitive implications.
After singling out the ALCM as a theoretically appealing base model, we develop Bayesian inference for a hierarchical version of this model using MCMC. Specifically, we develop a prior that flexibly incorporates prior knowledge about substitution and complementarity relationships, supports relationships that are absolutely strong, e.g., essentially perfect substitution among a subset of offers, and allows for individual level departures.
On the computational side we first develop a method to construct good proposal densities based on approximate data augmentation. The method facilitates Metropolis-Hastings sampling in situations where large step sizes are required by construction of the model. Second, we develop a method that circumvents the evaluation of the normalizing constant in the ALCM's likelihood which is computationally prohibitive in larger choice sets based on an efficient simulator for ratios of normalizing constants (ref to the yellow book) as part of the MCMC. We thus avoid the need for inference based on a pseudo-likelihood. Although pseudo-likelihood based inference is common for this model, and is consistent in large samples, its performance depends on the unobserved values of data generating parameters in our application.
We apply our model to data from an MBCE designed to study demand for game consoles and accessories by GfK. We find strong evidence for the empirical relevance of substitution and complementarity relationships in our data, demonstrate superior predictive performance relative to extant models, and illustrate implications for optimal pricing of offers in the menu.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we review the ALCM and contrast it to the multivariate probit model (Liechty et al., 2001 ) and to including crossprice effects in independent binomial logit models (Orme, 2010) . In section 3 we develop our hierarchical prior for the ALCM. In section 4 we present the data along with estimation results. In section 5 we discuss pricing implications. We conclude with a summary and an outlook. Technical aspects of fully Bayesian inference for the ALCM are detailed in the Appendix.
Models for Menu Based Choice
The Autologistic Choice Model Besag (1972) developed what we call the ALCM here for the analysis of multivariate binary spatial data. Besag develops this model from the causal argument that the conditional probability of an event at a focal site in the spatial array should only depend on the observable states of directly connected neighboring sites in that array, i.e., on whether an event has occurred at these sites or not, and possibly on non-spatial characteristics of the focal site. In other words, all spatial dependence in this model is fully mediated by the observable binary states of directly connected neighboring sites.
Besag shows that this causal argument alone together with the requirement that a proper joint distribution of events on the array exists implies that (i) causal influences that affect the states of neighboring sites additively separate from the neighboring sites' contribution to the event at the focal site, (ii) conditional probabilities are in the form of binominal logit or logistic models, and (iii) the joint probability of a particular configuration of events is in multinomial logit form.
In our context, the array is the menu a respondent chooses from and the events on the array are choices of individual offers from the menu. However, the causal connections between offers in the menu primarily stem from substitution and complementarity relationships among offers in the menu, and not from the menu's spatial configuration. Therefore, the structure of the causal connections between offers is not observed and needs to be inferred. We will further develop the economic interpretation of the model below.
Definition and Characterization
To formally illustrate the ALCM consider a menu containing k = 1, . . . , K offers. Restricting attention to binary choice of individual offers as common in MBCEs, there are j = 1, . . . , J possible choices where J = 2 K . The probability of making choice j is defined as ,
where the offers comprising choice j contribute additively separably to the function f (j), i.e.,
Here β k is a parameter related to the attractiveness of, or utility from offer k, and θ j is related to the differential utility from the particular combination j of offers in the menu. Economic reasons for this differential utility are complementary and substitutive relationships among the offers in choice j. Equation 1 reduces to the familiar multinomial logit model when all θ j approach negative infinity. Defining j as that combination of offers that is equal to j but excludes offer k, i.e., j ≡ j \ k, we see, from the ratio of the probability of j, i.e., the joint probability of choosing some combination of offers including k to the marginal probability of j with respect to k that the conditional choice probability of offer k is in the form of a binomial logit model, (equation 3).
This conditional probability can be equivalently interpreted as the probability of choosing offer k presented after someone made choice j from an arbitrary menu that did not feature offer k, or as the probability of seeing choice k from an arbitrary menu that includes k given that j is the observed choice up to offer k. Remarkably, it is independent from the characteristics of rejected offers and their potential influence if chosen from this arbitrary menu. It was this property that motivated Besag's (1972) original development.
The direct effect from choice j on the conditional choice probability of k is thus (θ j − θ j ). If offers in j neither enhance nor subtract from the utility of k and vice versa, i.e., if there is no connection between k and offers in j , then θ j = θ j and P (k|j ) = P (k|¬j ) = P (k). If there is a connection between offers in j and k, and offers in j collectively substitute
The above relationships between P (k), P (k|j ), and P (k|¬j ) are local in the sense they implicitly condition on not choosing anything else that is not in j or k from a larger menu M comprised of j , k, and other options. This is best illustrated in an example. Consider offers A, B and C with utilities a, b, and c and interactions θ AB > 0, θ AC > 0, θ BC = −∞, and θ ABC = −∞, i.e., the combinations {A, B} and {A, C} are more attractive than the sum of their parts but B and C are perfect substitutes. Then, P (B, C|A)dC = P (B, C|A) + P (B, ¬C|A) equals
and P (B, C|¬A)dC = P (B, C|¬A) + P (B, ¬C|¬A) equals
Whereas θ AB > 0 implies P (B|¬A) < P (B) < P (B|A) and vice versa in the small menu that consists of only A and B, Equations 4 and 5 illustrate that P (B, C|A)dC can be smaller
Closely related, the sign of the interaction term θ AB determines the sign of the change in the marginal probability of choosing B when changing the attractiveness of A, i.e., the sign of the cross-derivative in a menu comprised of only A and B (Equations 6 and 7).
In larger menus the cross-derivatives not only depend on the θ-element linking the respective offers. Returning to the example of a menu consisting of alternatives A, B, and C with utilities net of interactions a, b, and c, the cross-derivative dP (B)/da becomes
Inspection of the numerator in equation 8 shows that there are parameter constellations where the cross-derivative is negative even if θ AB > 0, for example. The intuition is that the (direct) complementarity between A and C could be stronger than that between A and B, i.e., θ AC > θ AB while C acts as a strong (direct) substitute to B, i.e., θ BC << 0. It is also possible to find parameter constellations where the cross-derivative is positive even if θ AB < 0. However, these reversals because of indirect effects on the marginal share of B are not inconsistent with economic theory, but simply a consequence of the availability and the nature of offer C that influences the marginal relationship between A and B.
Identification and Parameterization
Repeated choices from a given menu with K offers identify all J = 2 K choice probabilities in Equation 1. These probabilities in turn just identify the parameters in Equation 2 subject to a normalization required because of J j=1 P (j) = 1. As customary in choice models, we normalize the utility of the outside good to zero, i.e., set f (j ≡ ∅) = 0.
In all but the smallest menus, an attempt to calibrate all j = 1, . . . , (J − 1) model parameters from observed choices is hopeless because the number of observations is likely smaller than the number of parameters. For example, in a menu with K = 20 offers, we would need data to estimate 2 20 = 1, 048, 576 choice probabilities to identify the corresponding 2 20 − 1 parameters. One way to achieve more parsimony is to define every θ j as the sum of bivariate relationships among the k = 1, . . . , K j offers that constitute choice j:
1 Note that the cross-derivative in Equation 7 is zero for θ AB = 0.
Here I(arg) evaluates to one if arg is true and else to zero. This constraint reduces the number of parameters to estimate from 2
The result is still a very flexible model in that every offer potentially interacts with every other offer in the menu. However, bivariate interactions are implicitly assumed to be stable across choices that involve more than two offers. A counter-example are three individual offers A, B, and C that only become attractive when chosen together.
Under the constraint in equation 9 it is useful to define the matrix Θ as
Then the double sum in Equation 9 can be more compactly expressed in matrix form as
where ltr is short for lower-triangular. Many MBCE's include utility shifters, such as e.g., prices of individual offers that vary across menus as part of an experimental design. The standard practice of including prices as 'linear attributes' in the (indirect) utility of individual offers, i.e.,
corresponds to a quasilinear utility specification for choices j = 1, . . . , J from a menu (see Equation 2 ) from which income drops out. Therefore, the utility interactions θ k,k should be interpreted as interactions in direct utility only. For example, a negative element θ k,k is negative because alternative k makes alternative k appear superfluous, not because alternative k consumed income that could have been spent on k . Moreover, linearity in price implies that respondents maximize 'utility-surplus' from choice j, i.e., the difference between the direct utility of choice j and the utility loss due to its price, which in turn corresponds to direct utility in the form of a step function that is flat after the first unit of the utility maximizing choice j. However, in applications it seems prudent to interpret the model as local approximation given income and a specified range of prices to investigate. Liechty et al. (2001) proposed the multivariate probit model (MvP) as basic model for data from MBCEs with the understanding that error correlations capture complementary and substitutive relationships between offers in the menu. However, while error correlations in the MvP can certainly reflect complementary and substitutive relationships, the MvP fails at generating important implications from the economic definition of substitution and complementarity. Most notably, all cross derivatives in the MvP are zero by definition of the model if the only connection between offer-specific utilities is through correlated errors. This property of the MvP is best illustrated using an example. Consider a menu con-sisting of the two alternatives A and B with attractiveness or utility a and b, and define the corresponding random utilities as z A and z B . Then the marginal probability of choosing B from this two item menu is defined as P (z B > 0). Starting from the joint distribution p(z A , z B ), this probability corresponds to the following double integral:
The Multivariate Probit Model
where ρ AB is the correlation between random utilities z A and z B . As obvious from the last line of Equation 13, dP (B)/da = 0, i.e., the marginal share of B is independent of the the attractiveness of A for all latent utility correlations ρ AB . This implication of the MvP is inconsistent with the economic definition of substitutive and complementary relationships that at some level imply decreasing (increasing) demand for the substitute (complement) B as the attractiveness of A increases. It follows that in applications where a prior understanding of the offers in a menu suggest that cross-derivatives are likely to be non-zero, e.g., that increasing the price of offer k will shift demand from k to k , the MvP is inadequate. A closely related drawback of the MvP as a model suggested to capture substitutive and complementary relationships is that error correlations alone, even in the limit, cannot capture perfect substitution. Consider the example of two offers that are both relatively attractive compared to the outside good depicted in the left panel of Figure 1 . As the error correlation approaches negative one, the joint density of latent utilities eventually collapses to the line crossing through the positive orthant, implying positive probability for the event that both offers are chosen together. Only when the utilities of both offers are less than or equal to zero, negative error correlations eventually translate into zero probability of choosing both offers together (see the right panel of Figure 1 ). A similar argument can be made for perfect complementarity. A different question is how to empirically distinguish between dependencies that arise from utility correlations as in the MvP and utility interactions as in the ALCM. We noted earlier that repeated choices from a fixed menu are sufficient to just identify the parameters of the ALCM in Equation 2. In a menu comprised of only the two offers A and B, the data yield four probabilities P (A), P (B), P (A, B), and P (∅) that can identify three linearly independent parameters. Thus, before invoking special cases such e.g., perfect substitution between two individually attractive offers (see Figure 1) 2 , both the ALCM and the MvP are just identified and thus empirically indistinguishable.
However, exogenous variation in the base-line probability of A or B will distinguish between the ALCM and the MvP. Consider for example choices from three different 'menus' consisting of {A}, {B}, and {A, B}, respectively and note that the probability of choosing B [A] from the menu consisting of only {A} [only {B}] is exogenously equal to zero. According to the MvP, the marginal probability of choosing A [B] is independent of the menu context, i.e., P (A|{A}) = P (A|{A, B}) [P (B|{B}) = P (B|{A, B})] (see Equation 13 ). In contrast, the ALCM will predict P (A|{A}) = P (A|{A, B}) [P (B|{B}) = P (B|{A, B})], unless there is no utility interaction between offers A and B, i.e., θ AB = 0 (see Equation 6 ). The same argument holds if there are utility shifters, for example offer-specific prices, that only enter the corresponding offers' utilities directly.
Yet another question is if correlations between latent utilities as in the MvP and utility interactions as in the ALCM can be jointly identified. We will defer a thorough answer to this question to future research (see also Gentzkow (2007)). In our application to MBCEs, substitution and complementarity together with persistent heterogeneity are the first order concerns and we will leave the discussion of direct utility interactions versus utility correlations at the level of model comparisons.
Cross-Price Effects
The current industry standard to handle demand dependencies among offers in MBCEs is to include selected cross-price effects into the offers' utility functions (Orme, 2010) . The random utility of offer k is specified as
resulting in conditionally independent binomial logit models for the K offers in a menu. A conceptual problem of this approach is that offer k's conditional utility depends on the price of k independent of whether k is chosen or not, which contradicts basic utility theory. Similar to the MvP but for different reasons, cross-price effects fail to rationalize perfect substitution among offers. Moreover, for common functional forms of the cross-price effects, optimization over prices given parameters is bound to yield solutions that suggest to maximize demand for a high-margin offer by setting the price for substitutes to infinity.
We conclude that the ALCM has important theoretical advantages over the MvP and independent binomial logit models that include cross-price effects (IndepCPE) as a basic model for MBCEs. Next we develop Bayesian inference for this model including a parsimonious prior for the utility interaction parameters (see Equation 10) in the ALCM.
The Hierarchical Prior and Bayesian Inference
The ALCM described in the previous Section 2 implies the following individual i (i = 1, . . . , N ) specific utility function for choice j consisting of some combination of offers from menu t (t = 1, . . . , T ) with a total of K offers:
Inference for the parameters in Equation 15 is challenging, and in particular in the context of MBCEs. First, the normalizing constant of the likelihood in Equation 1 has J = 2 K terms and becomes prohibitively expensive to compute in larger menus. We propose a solution to this problem enabling likelihood based Bayesian inference in technical Appendix A. Second, in a MBCE each respondent typically only makes choices from a small set of different menus, i.e., T is small. However, MBCEs typically include many respondents, i.e., N is relatively much larger than T . Therefore it is natural to attempt inference using a hierarchical model that pools information across respondents.
Hierarchical Prior
The standard hierarchical prior formulation, i.e., a multivariate normal prior coupled with the likelihood implied by Equations 1 and 15 is well suited for parameters ( price,i ) that characterize the attractiveness of individual offers, it is less useful for inference about the utility-interaction parameters in Θ i . The reason for the inadequacy of the standard hierarchical prior in this case is heterogeneity in what respondents perceive to be perfect substitutes.
Recall that utility interactions θ k,k ,i in Θ i measure interactions in direct utility. For example, if respondent i receives no additional direct utility at all from offer k once he chooses offer k and vice versa, the corresponding parameter θ k,k ,i is negative infinity for this respondent. However, if another respondent i + 1 perceives horizontal differences between offer k and offer k such that choosing k and k together becomes a possibility, θ k,k for this respondent is 'infinitely' larger than for respondent i.
The standard approach to accommodating such extreme forms of heterogeneity is to use a hierarchical prior defined as a discrete mixture of distributions. In the following, we develop a hierarchical prior for Θ i based on this idea, but in addition we pool information across individual elements θ k,k based on a prior understanding of the nature of the bivariate interactions. Pooling across individual elements θ k,k is necessary because of the limited amounts of likelihood information to inform individual parameters θ k,k ,i in Θ i . For example, the individual level likelihood of a respondent's choices across a (short) sequence of menus is maximized by setting all θ k,k ,i that correspond to offers that were never chosen together to negative infinity. The implication that all these pairs are perfect substitutes to this respondent is very likely to be very wrong.
Our hierarchical prior classifies each element
. . , N into one of three different 'classes' based on an ordinal-probit regression. Equation 16 shows the 'latent' linear equation underlying the ordinal-probit and Figure 2 depicts how the latent dependent variable z k,k ,i in this regression maps into the distinct classes denoted s, i, and c based on fixed truncation points at zero and one. The class labels s, i, and c are intentionally chosen to relate to substitution, independence, and complemenartiy. We will revisit this point below. Prior knowledge associated with θ k,k ,i is encoded in the design vector w k,k . If a particular bivariate interaction θ k,k is a priori expected to be similar to that between k and k , i.e., θ k,k , for example, then w k,k is set equal to w k,k . However, note that the classification implied by the ordinal-probit model is probabilistic for all σ 2 > 0 and −∞ < w k,k δ < ∞, such that the likelihood information in a respondent's choices may result in a posterior classification of a particular element θ k,k ,i different from its (most likely) prior classification.
Conditional on classifications of individual θ k,k ,i , we specify hierarchical normal, inverse Gamma (NIG) priors for the distribution of θ-elements in each class:
To compensate for the limited individual level likelihood information and to regularize our inference problem, we assume that θ-elements, given classifications, are (relatively) tightly distributed around some location. For the s-and the c-class we essentially fix V θ equal to one but use a diffuse prior forθ. For the i-classθ is fixed at zero and V θ constrained to be practically zero. To further illustrate this prior consider the following matrix of design vectors w k,k :
The columns correspond to coefficients δ in Equation 16, where the first coefficient is a constant and the following coefficients measure departures from that constant. For example, δ = (.5, −5, −2, 6) implies that the θ-parameter corresponding to the first line of the matrix above, and all other θ-parameters with the same design vector, a priori most likely connect two independent offers such that they should be zero (see Figure 2 ). For the second and third line in the matrix above these δ-values imply that the corresponding θ-parameters are similar, but different from zero. In principle, the likelihood will determine if they are smaller (substitution) or larger than zero (complementarity). However, depending on the prior knowledge about thus grouped θ-elements, the prior expectation in one of the two directions will be strong. For the fifth and sixth line in the matrix above these δ-values again imply that the corresponding θ-parameters are similar, different from zero, and likely different from the θ-parameters corresponding to lines two and three. Again, the likelihood will determine if they are smaller (substitution) or larger than zero (complementarity). And again, depending on the prior knowledge about thus grouped θ-elements, the prior expectation in one of the two directions will be strong.
We envision that in most applications, prior information will be rich enough to both establish expected similarities among θ-parameters as well as an expectation about the directional departure from zero for at least some of the resulting groupings. Finally, δ 2 = −2 implies that the θ-parameter corresponding to the fourth line in matrix W is less likely to be zero than that corresponding to the first line and potentially similar to those θ-parameters that correspond to lines two and three.
More formally, our hierarchical ordinal-probit model implies the following prior classification probabilities for θ-parameters depending on the corresponding w-vectors, and parameters δ and σ 2 in the hierarchical classification prior:
The hierarchical prior on individual elements θ k,k ,i established in Equations 16 through 20 has the following desirable properties: i) it allows a collection of θ-parameters believed to be similar a priori to take extreme values such that they can e.g., reflect essentially perfect substitution among a collection of offers in a menu, ii) because it does not impose these extreme values for all respondents, as the posterior classification of a particular element θ k,k ,i may depart from its prior classification. Moreover, the posterior of the parameters in the hierarchical classification prior, i.e., δ and σ 2 in Equations 16 and 18 through 20 will reveal if the prior grouping of θ-parameters is supported by the data or not. For example, δ = 0 coupled with small σ 2 points to agreement between prior and posterior classifications. In summary, our prior corresponds to an adaptive grid over the real line that anticipates concentrations of θ-parameters around some negative value (θ (s) ), at zero (θ (i) ≡ 0) and around some positive value (θ (c) ). We will refer to the model using this prior as 'ALCMhetinformative'.
A theoretical drawback of the prior developed above is that is allows offers to be classified as substitutes a posteriori even if the prior expectation is that they are complements and vice versa. In many applications such reclassifications will be regarded as a result of overfitting the data. In this case it is useful to restrict the applicability of Equations 18 to 20 to a subset of θ-parameters, and to apply the following prior classification rules to θ-parameters that are believed to connect substitutes, a priori:
Equations 21 and 22 constrain the departure from the prior hypothesis of substitution between two offers to independence and thus avoid the reclassification of prior substitutes into posterior complements deterministically. Obviously, the same approach can be used to avoid the reclassification of prior complements into posterior substitutes deterministically as well. In our illustrative case study, we will refer to this restricted prior as 'ALCMhet-restricted' and compare it to ALCMhet-informative developed earlier. Further benchmark priors we investigate comprise a version of ALCMhet-informative with W = 1I N K(K−1)/2 such that the hierarchical prior classification into the three different classes s, i, and c only reflect the general prevalence of these classes in the population of all θ-parameters ('ALCMhet'), and an ALCM where Θ i ≡ Θ, i.e., all utility interactions are assumed to be homogeneous. We will refer to this model as 'ALCMhom'.
We defer the details of Bayesian inference based on the hierarchical priors discussed here to technical Appendix B, but briefly comment on the problems of inference based on the otherwise common pseudo-likelihood in a hierarchical setting next.
The Pseudo-Likelihood in a Hierarchical Model
The pseudo-likelihood (PL) proposed by Besag (1972) , conveniently approximates the joint likelihood function by the product of full conditional distributions:
where
is the conditional choice probability of offer k in a menu defined in Equation 3. The conditional choice probabilities (Equation 3) are in the form of binomial logits and their product is easily computed, even for extremely large menus. For the special case of Θ = 0, but only for this special case, we have that the product of conditional choice probabilities in Equation 23 is identical to the probability of choice j defined in Equation 1:
When Θ = 0, i.e., in the presence of utility interactions, inference based on the PL is only large-sample consistent (e.g., Särkkä, 1996; Zhao and Joe, 2005) . However, other authors report that the difference between PL and likelihood based inference is only in efficiency (ref). Therefore, one reason to not rely on the PL in the application to MBCEs is the fact that the number or repeated measurements T is usually small in these applications. However, a second reason for definitely avoiding the PL in the context of small T large(er) N applications that is sometimes overlooked is that the successive conditioning on y i \ y k inherent to the PL violates the assumption that observed conditioning arguments in the individual level likelihood need to be independent of individual level parameters a hierarchical model. This is clearly not the case for observed choice outcomes as conditioning arguments. The violation of this assumption biases the way information is pooled in the hierarchy and translates into potentially severely biased inference as a consequence (see Liu et al. [2007] for an illustration of this bias).
To alleviate the problem, we propose to use an efficient simulation based estimator of the likelihood ratio as part of MCMC-based Bayesian inference in technical Appendix A. The simulation based estimator of the likelihood ratio takes advantage of the fact that Gibbssampling from the set of conditional distributions (see Equation 3) is reliable, fast way to generate data from the likelihood in Equation 1, which in itself is computationally intractable for larger menus.
Illustrative Case Study Data
We illustrate our method using data obtained from an MBCE that simulates purchases of durable goods -game consoles and game console accessories. The experiment was conducted in 2013 by GfK SE as a study aimed at mimicking typical client demands but for strictly academic purposes. Respondents were recruited from an on-line panel.
Menus
Menus were designed in the form of a webshop, where respondents could put products into an electronic shopping basket. The shopping basket always clearly displayed the total expenditure, i.e., the sum of the prices of individual offers in the shopping basket to respondents. Respondents could explicitly indicate that they would not purchase a single offer from a particular menu using a no-choice option. Each respondent was exposed to twelve menus and clearly instructed to treat them independently. Two out of the twelve menus were designed as holdouts and identical across all respondents. The other ten menus differed across respondents and were used for estimation. Each menu comprised the same thirteen products, however at varying prices.
Stimuli
Products were represented by three different brands (Microsoft, Sony, and Nintendo), including different game consoles (Xbox 360, Xbox One, PS3, PS4, Wii, and Wii U) and game console accessories (Xbox Kinect, Xbox Wheel, PS Eye Cam, PS Move, PS Wheel, Wii Wheel, and Wii Motion). The technical features of game consoles were constant across all menus. All consoles came with basic equipment, i.e, were usable without purchasing additional offers, and respondents could retrieve the information on technical details by hovering the mouse over an offer. The exogenous variation across menus came through different prices of individual offers. Thus, the offer specific utility in our models is the sum of an alternative-specific constant and linearly scaled price (see Equation 12).
Sample
Besides solving choice tasks, respondents reported demographic information as well information about their gaming behavior. Table 1 summarizes descriptive statistics. The average respondent in our sample is male, about 42 years old, lives in a three-person household, and has high school education. Respondents were asked which products they really consider buying during the next twelve months for themselves or their household. We made sure only those respondents could participate in the experiment who were in the market for game consoles and (or) accessories. Participants were pre-screened by questions about game console ownership and future purchase intentions. If a respondent had no console at home and was unlikely to purchase one, the experiment terminated.
In our analyses we excluded all respondents who always chose the outside option over the course of the repeated measurements. These respondents do not provide any information about their relative preferences and substitution and complementarity relationships among offers in the menus. Thus, the sample used for estimation included 453 respondents. Hence, the total number of choice-sets (menus) used for estimation was 4530. Out of these at least one item was chosen on 3403 occasions. Overall, respondents made 1669 multivariate choices, i.e., chose more than one item from one menu. The outside good was preferred on 1127 choice occasions. Table 2 details marginal and bi-variate choice counts for the 13 products aggregated over respondents and repeated measurements. For example, PS4 was chosen 1214 times in total and PS4 and PS Wheel were chosen together 277 times, marginal with respect to other offer choices that may have accompanied this pair. Inspection of the table reveals higher dependence between game consoles and accessories of the same brand compared to other pairs of products. It is also apparent that different consoles are sometimes chosen together and therefore are not uniformly viewed as perfect substitutes. 
Models
In addition the various ALCM specifications, ALCM with homogeneous Θ (ALCMhom), ALCM with heterogeneous Θ (ALCMhet), ALCM with heterogeneous Θ with informative prior (ALCMhet inform), and ALCM with heterogeneous Θ with restricted informative prior (ALCMhet restr), we include three more models in our empirical model comparison: an independence model obtained from the the ALCM by setting all utility interactions to zero (Indep), the multivariate probit model (MvP) and an independence model with selected cross-price effects (IndepCPE). When we estimate the ALCMhet-inform the design matrix W that enters the hierarchical classification prior (see Equations 16 and 18 through 20) is based on four rules: i) utility interactions, i.e., θ-parameters that connect two consoles are a priori similar to each other (and expected to be negative), ii) utility interactions that connect a console to accessories of the same brand are a priori similar (and expected to be positive), iii) utility interactions that connect a consoles to accessories of a different brand are a priori similar (and expected to be negative), and iv) utility interactions that connect accessories of different brands are a priori similar (and expected to be negative).
When we estimate the ALCMhet-restr, we only rely on two rules that are, however, partially dogmatic: i) utility interactions, i.e., θ-parameters that connect two consoles are a priori similar to each other, and expected to be negative. As an exception a particular such interaction θ k,k ,i may equal zero. ii) utility interactions that connect a console to accessories of the same brand are a priori similar and expected to be positive. As an exception a particular such interaction θ k,k ,i may equal zero. Table 3 summarizes posterior means of alternative-specific constants and price-sensitivity at the hierarchical prior level. Posterior standard deviations, i.e., 'Bayesian standard errors' are reported in parentheses. The rank order of mean preferences across models is mainly consistent. For example, new versions of the game consoles (Xbox One, PS4, and Wii U) deliver on average higher utility to respondents than older versions (Xbox 360, PS3, and Wii) and consoles deliver higher stand-alone utility than accessories. Table 4 summarizes heterogeneity, i.e., hierarchical prior standard deviations. Bayesian standard errors are in parentheses. Note that the MvP infers more heterogeneity in price sensitivity but less heterogeneity in alternative specific constants which is suggestive of differences to the various ALCM specifications that extend beyond differences in error scales.
Results
Moving on to utility interactions in the heterogeneous versions of the ALCM, the posterior of the hierarchical prior parameters that characterize the distribution of θ-elements classified as connecting (i)ndependent, (s)substitutive, and (c)omplementary offers strongly suggests that utility interactions are relevant for choices from the menus in our experiment (Table  5) . For all models, the posterior means ofθ (s) andθ (c) are sizable, relative to alternative specific constants, and well separated fromθ (i) ≡ 0, even after taking heterogeneity, i.e., V θ into account. .01) (0.11) (0.08) (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) Tables 6 through 8 report prior classification probabililities for θ-elements into the three classes i, s, and c. The observation that these probabilities vary by rule in Tables 7, and 8 and in the expected directions supports that the rules used to define W are at least partially useful to help structure θ-elements. Next, we compare posterior means of Θ i computed across respondents and MCMC-draws for the different ALCM versions (Tables 9, 11, 13, and 15). As a measure of heterogeneity, we report the posterior mean of standard deviations computed across respondents (Tables 10, 12, and 14) . Recall that there is no heterogeneity in θ i in ALCMhom.
As alternative measures for comparison, we report the correlation matrix of error terms for MvP, as well as posterior means of individual cross-price effects from IndepCPE. Table  18 reports posterior means of standard deviations of cross-price effects computed across respondents in IndepCPE model as a measure of heterogeneity.
Interestingly, all θ-elements in ALCMhet are on average negative, although θ's connecting a console and an accessory of the same brand appear to be less negative. It seems as if the general prevalence of substitution relationships in the data leads to overestimation of substitution effects. ALCMhet informative seems to better reflect complementarity relationship between game consoles and accessories of the same brand, but not as well as ALCMhom and ALCMhet restricted. All other θ's are on average negative through all ALCM versions, where θ's connecting different consoles appear to be most extreme. Xbox 360 2.27 0.99 0 Xbox 360 Inspecting the entries in Table 16 , we recognize that MvP recovers positive correlation between consoles and accessories of the same brand (correlations of 0.09 to 0.53). However, negative correlations between different game consoles are comparably weak (0.09 to -0.36) . All cross-price effects in IndepCPE appear to be negative on average, even those connecting two game consoles (Table 17) . Tables 21 to 27 in Appendix C, report population level correlations in alternative-specific constants and price-sensitivity, i.e., preference correlations inferred from the different models. It appears that if the model does not measure demand interdependencies or is not able to measure them sufficiently, correlations in individual preferences for substitutes will be underestimated, whereas correlations in preferences for complements will be overestimated.
For example, correlations in individual preferences for game consoles and game console accessories of the same brand are on average higher in baseline models (e.g., the correlation between PS4 and PS Wheel is at 0.46 in the Indep model and much higher than that in ALCMhet restricted (0.18)). Similarly, correlations between two different consoles, irrespective of the brand, are lower in the Indep model (e.g., the correlation between PS3 and PS4 is 0.23 in the Indep model and noticeably lower than that in ALCMhet restricted (0.36) ). Higher correlation between PS3 and PS4 in ALCM can be explained by the fact that respondents actually like both consoles (high β i ), but are less likely to choose them together from a menu because of substitution. The Indep model assumes away substitutive and complementary relationships and compensates by biasing preference correlations.
Predictive Performance
Predictive performance is measured by hit rate (HR) and quasi predictive log-likelihood (QPLL). We differentiate between marginal and menu HR. The former is defined as the proportion of correctly predicted choices of items or individual offers in a menu (HR marginal), whereas the later is defined as a proportion of correctly predicted choice combinations (HR menu). For example, if an individual chooses {A,B} out of a menu {A,B,C} and we predict {A-chosen, B-chosen, C-not chosen}, we declare it as three hits for marginal HR and as one hit for menu HR. However, if we predict e.g. {A-chosen, B-chosen, C-chosen}, we handle it as two hits and one miss for marginal HR and as one miss for menu HR, although the choice of {A,B} was predicted correctly. Since HR treats the case with predicted probability of 0.51 to be the same as 0.99, it is difficult to say which model is more precise in its prediction. QPLL overcomes this problem, since it adopts a loss function with continuous form. QPLL of observing the data can be expressed as
and on the log scale
wherep ikt is the estimated probability of choosing item k in menu t by individual i, and y ikt represents the realized choice of item k in menu t by individual i. To getp ikt , we compute the probabilityp ikt at each draw of the posterior distribution of parameters and then take the average over iterations. The closer QPLL to zero, the better the predictive performance of the model. We compute predicted probabilities by Gibbs-sampling from the set of conditional probabilities that defines the pseudo-likelihood and integrate out posterior uncertainty in parameters. Table 19 summarizes predictive performance of the models we compare in our two holdout menus. First, there is no substantial difference across the models in marginal HR, which lies in the range between 93 and 94 %. If we decompose marginal HR to see how well the models predict choices and non-choices in particular, we recognize that the ALCM in general outperforms MvP in predicting marginal choices, being about 3 % better. IndepCPE also perform well in terms of HR marginal 1, but still is inferior to the ALCM in terms of QPLL. Marginal HR of non-choices again does not distinguish between models.
Second, the ALCMhet restrictive appears to be the most precise in estimation of the predictive probabilities. As such, the QPLL of ALCMhet restrictive is -1886.10, compared to, e.g., the QPLL of IndepCPE at -2376.19, being the least precise model. Finally, the crucial question in MBC analysis with demand interdependencies is how well the model predicts combinatorial outcomes. We recognize that Probit and IndepCPE are not competitive in terms of menu HR, lying about 4 to 5 % below the performance of ALCMs that account for heterogeneity in utility interactions. Interestingly, ALCMhom, which estimates homogeneous Θ across individuals, performs relatively better too, suggesting that utility interactions in the ALCM capture demand interdependencies better than the error correlations in the Probit. 
Pricing Implications
A simple model that ignores demand interdependencies might sometimes be sufficient to make good local predictions. The choice of the model becomes more important when a manager is to draw inferences about optimal control actions. In this section, we want to demonstrate how optimal pricing patterns for complements and substitutes differ from those for independently valued products under different model assumptions. We use the posterior obtained under different ALCM versions, as well as that from baseline models and solve a given optimization problem and compare the results. We find that accounting for substitution and complementary effects among offers results in different optimal prices for products, and seems to be in line with managerial pricing practices. Consider a monopolistic optimization problem, in which Sony optimizes prices for its products (PS3, PS4, PS Eye Cam, PS Move, and PS Wheel), given the competitor's products (Nintendo's Wii, Wii U, Wii Wheel, Wii Motion and Microsoft's Xbox 360, Xbox One, Xbox Kinect, Xbox Wheel) in the market. Under the assumption of fixed competition prices and zero costs, we define a grid of possible prices for Sony products and compute profits for each of the price combinations. Profits at a particular price combination are computed for each individual based on posterior means of β i and Θ i and then summed over all individuals. The optimal set of prices is defined as the one that results in the highest profit. Table 20 reports optimal sets of prices obtained with different models. In general, it is difficult to separate the net effect of substitution and complementarity in our optimization problem. On the one hand, there is a subsitution effect between the two consoles (PS3 and PS4). On the other hand, there is a complementary relationship between consoles and accessories (e.g. PS3 and PS Eye Camera). Intuitively, heterogeneity of the preferences of the population translates into choice of only one console by a respondent (PS3 or PS4).
In order to capitalize the maximum draw of error term, a monopolist will charge higher prices for two products that represent substitutes as compared to the case if these products had no direct relation to each other. Indeed, our results suggest that optimal prices of the PS consoles under the ALCM model are higher than those under baseline models. Models that ignore demand interdependencies or cannot capture them sufficiently result in positive probability of two consoles being chosen together by an individual who has positive preferences for both consoles. This leads to lower optimal prices compared to the model that can capture substitution between the consoles.
A simple test shows that if we force a θ-element that connects PS3 and PS4 under the ALCM model to be equal to zero over all individuals, we get lower optimal prices for the consoles, compared to the original situation, where this θ-element was on average negative.
Complementarity between two products suggests that there is a higher probability of a joint purchase of these products, which translates into lower optimal prices for complements compared to optimal prices of two independent products. From Table 20 we can see that, e.g., the Indep model, which completely ignores demand interdependencies, prices accessories higher than, e.g., the ALCMhet restricted. Thus, accounting for interdependence in demand relationships results in putatively better pricing decisions. Therefore, setting optimal prices, using a model that ignores or underestimates these relationships, will result in lower profits.
Discussion
In this paper we show that the ALCM provides a theoretically appealing framework for modeling choices from menus compared to extant models. We develop Bayesian inference for a hierarchical version of the ALCM. In this context, we propose a solution to the problem posed by the computationally intractable likelihood and auxiliary data augmentation to enable effective joint proposals of highly correlated parameters. Finally, we develop a parsimonious but flexible prior structure model, which accommodates prior hypotheses about substitution and complementarity patterns between items in a menu but allows for individual departures.
We illustrate our methodology through an application to real data from a study on durable goods, game consoles and accessories. We find evidence of substitution and complementarity effects in demand relationships across items. We find that the proposed model outperforms models that ignore or underestimate dependency structures. The inferior performance of the alternative models results from the inability to correctly predict the distribution of choices. Finally, we demonstrate that optimal pricing solutions for complements and substitutes are different from those for independently valued products. Therefore, ignoring or underestimating dependency structures may result in the choice of the sub-optimal strategies and, therefore, profit losses.
There are many choice situations that should not be studied in isolation. Capturing the interdependence among offers should lead to better predictive ability as well as keener insights into consumer behavior. Moreover, knowing consumer-level demand interdependence will help to make better marketing decisions, e.g. optimal pricing of the products or product line decisions.
Our findings highlight the importance of accounting for demand interdependencies and raise additional issues for further research. It is intuitive that consumer purchase decisions in the market for durable goods are highly dependent on individual inventories. For example, if a respondent in our MBCE consistently rejects consoles but chooses accessories it seems likely that this is because a console at home acts as a substitute for the consoles in the experiment. Hence, it could be interesting to extend the model by incorporating individual inventory into the analysis. Another interesting direction for further research is to extend Θ to more than two dimensions in order to capture higher order dependencies.
The auxiliary variables ζ ikt are then regressed on the individual design matrix and the individual choices (equation 30). The posterior of moments from this regression, coupled with the hierarchical prior are then used to generate a joint candidate value of β i and θ i , β the augmented latent variables, we need to account not only for the probability of proposing the candidate value p(β * c |ζ i ), but also for the density of the latent variables h(ζ i |β * i , y i ). To maintain the detailed balance conditions of the Metropolis chain, we need to assess both the probability of moving from β * i to ζ i to β * c i , as well as the probability of moving backwards from β * c i to ζ i to β * i .
7. Repeat step 6 for each individual i in {1, ..., N } 8. Repeat steps 1 to 7 for each iteration r in {1, ..., R} 
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